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Introduction:  Narcissism, Melancholia and the Subject of 
Community  





Trying to see you 
my eyes grow 
confused 
it is not your face 
they are seeking 
fingering through your spaces 
like a hungry child 
even now 
I do not want 
to make a poem 
I want to make you 
more and less 
a part 
from my self. 
 
Let us begin by saying that the address of Audre Lorde’s poem ‘Therapy’ is at once 
narcissistic and melancholic. By confusing the self with the other, as well as 
admitting confusion about what is lost of the other in the self, it enacts a process of 
identification which is both appropriative and impoverishing. ‘I want to make you / 
more and less’, Lorde writes, surprising us with a contradiction which is then 
amplified by the concluding couplet, ‘a part / from myself’. Where we expect 
separation (more or less) we find illogical conjunction; where we expect the fusion of 
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self and other (a part / of my self), we find fragmentation. The title suggests that the 
predicament of the poem is clinical; however, the ramifications are more broadly 
cultural. It asks the question, how does an ego get formed through its relation to the 
other? And, more paradoxically, how is the space between the self and the other 
maintained by a desire that continually moves to collapse it? By wanting to make you, 
as Lorde’s speaker claims, I want to create a space to contain my wanting. The 
spaces, then, which the speaker’s eyes ‘finger through’ in this poem, are neither 
internal nor external, rather they constitute the moving boundary between the ‘inside’ 
and the ‘outside’. 
Likewise, Sigmund Freud’s twin papers, ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ 
(1914) and ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917 [1915]), take as their formative 
concern the difficulty of setting apart the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ worlds, and of 
preserving a stable image of a boundaried self. As Samuel Weber puts it, paying 
tribute to the way the unconscious always places us beyond ourselves, ‘the relation of 
self and other, inner and outer, cannot be grasped as an interval between polar 
opposites but rather as an irreducible dislocation of the subject in which the other 
inhabits the self as the condition of possibility’ (2000, 68). Narcissism and 
melancholia attend to the vicissitudes of this inhabitation. Both terms, 
metapsychologically understood, address the difficulty of drawing lines between the 
self and the world: the narcissist who declares ‘I am the world, and the world is me’ 
obliterates the very distinction; the melancholic, famously in Freud’s formulation, 
expresses a worldly impoverishment as a self-destitution, object-loss is transformed 
into ego-loss: ‘In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in 
melancholia it is the ego itself’ (M&M, 246). To speak of narcissistic or melancholic 
identifications, then, is to explore how we are made through our passionate 
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entanglements with others beyond our selves in ways that eschew a settled reading of 
the ‘beyond’ in question. Allowing for great interpretative elasticity, psychoanalytic 
theories of narcissism and melancholia call into question the story of the contained, 
unit-self whose known contours signal her possession of secure borders. They are also 
terms of import for cultural analysis.  
Whilst it is true that the term narcissism especially has come to be deployed in 
ways that seem foreign to the complexities of Freud’s 1914 paper (by its reduction to 
a personality disorder for example), it remains the case that neither narcissism nor 
melancholia can be thought about today without expressing some debt to Freudian 
metapsychology. However, whereas Freud was most evidently concerned to describe 
the structure of ego-formation, many subsequent commentators have preferred to 
emphasise the cultural and normative dimensions of the terms. If we consider their 
respective discursive histories we can see that narcissism and melancholia have been 
put to work in very different ways (see more below), and yet remain grounded by a 
shared concern with modes of relation and identification. This shared concern, we 
would suggest, is the basis upon which they’ve been most productively reanimated in 
recent years: the rise of melancholia as a critical aid to the study of cultural 
displacement and dispossession (Khanna 2003; Gilroy 2005; Butler 1997, 2004; Frosh 
2013), and the determined redemption of narcissism from its pejorative 
characterization as fundamentally anti-social (Bersani 2010; DeArmitt 2014; Lunbeck 
2014; Walsh 2015). What is most noteworthy in this post-Freudian literature is the 
increasing relevance of metapsychology to social and political theory, especially for 
the purpose of theorising a reflexive and embodied subjectivity. 
Significantly, Lorde’s ‘Therapy’, which, we suggest, returns us to the 
formative dilemmas of Freudian metapsychology (both narcissistic and melancholic), 
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also carries the resonance of particular socio-political histories. Lorde begins by 
rejecting the self-evidence of the lyric ‘I’, insisting rather on the confusions which 
condition her identity as a mid-twentieth century American poet who is not 
predictably white, or male, or straight: ‘Trying to see you / my eyes grow / confused’. 
She substitutes the ‘I’ with ‘growing eyes’, effortless expressivity with endeavor, and 
in each successive line de-stabilizes the ground of the line that went before: ‘my eyes 
grow / confused / it is not your face / they are seeking’.  ‘They’ are mine (my eyes 
looking at you), yet ‘they’ are also plural and alien looking for someone other than 
you: ‘they’ are the instruments of both internal and external regard.  
Emerging from these estranging, mirroring relations is the contemplation of a 
disregarded face, suggestive of an unrecognizable poet (a black lesbian poet) whose 
desire is forced by historical circumstance to exceed the making of what is standardly 
recognized as ‘a poem’. At the centre of Lorde’s endeavor lies the psychoanalytic 
image of the feeding infant, uncertain of the difference between self and [m]other: 
every desiring ‘I’, it is implied, is ‘like a hungry child’. And yet we are trusted to 
concede, through the terms of our own self-regard, that a particular ‘hungry child’, 
racialized and sexualized in a particular way, and given particular historical 
coordinates, is not like every ‘I’. It is this joint articulation of therapeutic universality 
on the one hand (we are all hungry, desirous children) and historical specificity on the 
other, which frames the endeavor of this volume. Against the standardising tendency 
within the grammar of metapsychology, we ask how the concepts of narcissism and 
melancholia can be used to inform and express historical difference today.    
 
Terms & Conditions 
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Freud wrote ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ and ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ in 
the space of three years, from 1913 to 1915, though the latter paper wasn’t published 
until 1917. Despite their temporal proximity and shared commitment to untangling 
the same metapsychological knots, the papers are remarkably different in tone and 
style. By the writer’s own admission, ‘On Narcissism’, had a difficult birth, proving 
something of a Frankensteinian monster, bursting at the seams with an overabundance 
of material.1 But then came ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, ready to be considered the 
more beautiful sister. The reception histories of each text tell us something further 
about the power of this distinction of style, since, whilst the former has been variously 
challenged, dismissed or declared theoretically impenetrable, the latter has more often 
been appreciated for a few of its most elegant formulations – formulations derived 
from the convenient provision of a binary (mourning as opposed to melancholia) 
which the narcissism paper conspicuously lacks.2 This introductory chapter is not the 
place to visit in great detail the intricacies of each paper, but it is worth setting out in 
précis, insofar as that’s possible, the formative challenges they present for a reader 
who is concerned to tie questions of ego-formation to those of social relation.  
We can begin with ‘On Narcissism’, the theoretical ramifications of which can 
be helpfully enumerated:  
 
                                                
1	Freud wrote the following to Karl Abraham: ‘Tomorrow I am sending you the narcissism, which was 
a difficult birth and bears all the marks of it. Naturally, I do not like it particularly, but I cannot give 
anything else at the moment. It is still very much in need of retouching’ (ON, 222). 
2	To say that ‘On Narcissism’ lacks a principal organising binary, is not to say that there aren’t binary 
conventions operating throughout the paper (e.g. ego-libido/object libido; and variants of 
narcissistic/anaclitic attachment).	
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(1) In positioning the different functions of narcissism in the male and female 
negotiations of the Oedipus complex, the paper adds weight and detail to 
Freud’s theories of the development of sexuality and in particular to the 
ongoing problem of feminine psychology. (2) In providing an early exposition 
of the ego-ideal which foreshadows the development of the superego (1923), it 
carves out an important space for later theorising on the relationship between 
narcissism and an account of culture. (3) In exploring the twin characteristics 
of ‘megalomania’ and ‘a withdrawal of interest from the external world’, it 
sharpens the distinction between the transference neuroses and the narcissistic 
neuroses, and establishes narcissism’s proximity to psychosis (and 
schizophrenia). (4) It reflects an important alteration in Freud’s theory of the 
instincts, leading some to observe that it represents the first systematic shift 
from id-psychology to ego-psychology. (5) In outlining the availability of 
alternative object-choices and describing the vicissitudes of each, it opens up 
avenues for investigating the development of intersubjectivity under the rubric 
of (what would become) object relations theory. (6) In making frequent 
reference to terms such as self-regard, self-esteem and self-contentment, it 
suggests a particular understanding of the concept of the self which would 
come to have a bearing both on the development of neo-Freudian strands of 
psychoanalysis (e.g. the self psychology of Heinz Kohut), and, arguably, on 
the cultural and discursive reverence for ‘selfhood’ in association with the 
narcissism of late modernity. (7) Perhaps most problematically, by insisting on 
the universal state of primary narcissism, as the state to which the libido is 
driven to recover, Freud’s paper of 1914 makes important connections with 
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both the incorporative features of mourning and melancholia (1917b [1915]), 
and the ‘return to stasis’ of the death drive (1920a). (Walsh, 2015:15)3 
 
This brief catalogue gives us some impression of the diversity of the paper’s 
speculations, but it’s the last point of connection –the idea of a withdrawal of libido 
onto the object of the ego– that provides the most important link between the terms of 
this volume.  
Melancholia, as already suggested, comes equipped with its own opposite, 
healthy mourning; it has also, on occasion, been placed as narcissism’s necessary 
other, where narcissism connotes the fantasy of fullness and self-sufficiency, and 
melancholia records the constitutive lack at the heart of all subjectivity. But such a 
neat separation, we would suggest from the outset, is more rhetorical than factual: in 
fact Freud makes very plain that melancholia tends regressively towards narcissism 
(MM, 250). As the counterpoint to so-called ‘healthy’ mourning and ‘working 
through’, melancholia prefigures the conception of the death-drive with its tendency 
to daemonic repetitions – through what Freud calls the ‘dissatisfaction with the ego on 
moral grounds’ (MM, 248). Furthermore, it exemplifies the mechanism of 
unconscious incorporation; by incorporating the lost object, transferring an 
impoverishment in the world to an impoverishment in the ego, the melancholic 
unconsciously enacts a version of narcissistic self-attachment. The libido released by 
the lost object gets drawn back into the ego and binds the ego in identification with 
what is missing.  
 
                                                
3	In addition to Walsh 2015, see also chapter 2 of Reuben Fine’s work Narcissism, The Self and 
Society for a discussion of these themes.		
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Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could 
henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the 
forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-
loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage 
between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by 
identification. (MM, 249) 
 
The shadow of the object falling upon the ego is a typically Freudian refrain, insofar 
as it does not console us with a single meaning. From one perspective, melancholia 
constitutes a denial of loss – I keep the other alive inside myself. This, Freud warns us, 
has delightfully punitive consequences due to the force of ambivalence – I hate loving 
you because you’ve abandoned me; I love hating you because you’re still here. A love 
object that cannot be given-up becomes the occasion for an ‘enjoyable’ self-hatred 
once it imaginatively inhabits the confines of a single breast.  
From another perspective, however, the same melancholic praxis of self-
berating, reveals more than it denies. Instead of only being a disavowal of loss, 
melancholia also connects us to the psychoanalytic rudiments of ego-formation. This 
is indicated by another of Freud’s refrains: the melancholic ‘knows whom he has lost 
but not what he has lost in him’ (245). Whereas so-called healthy mourning entails a 
conscious absorption in the work of separating the lost object from the self, by finding 
reparative, substitutive objects; melancholia persists in a state of confusion; (though at 
this point we might want to soften the conceptual distinction in Freud’s paper, on the 
grounds that all meaningful losses trouble what we think we know). Whether it is an 
actual death, the end of a love affair, the secession of a country from a political union, 
or a more enigmatic shift in circumstance, the lost object is difficult to define – it is 
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never simply itself. To take a commonplace example: when a man dies, it is not 
simply the man who is lost; rather we might have lost a greater, symbolic value which 
the man has come to represent (fatherhood or authority, for example), or instead a 
more minor characteristic which the man has been considered to possess (the way he 
laughed for example, or his uneven gait). In this way, because the contours of the lost 
object are not fixed, ordinary loss is always ambiguously defined. In melancholia this 
ordinary ambiguity is exacerbated by the operation of incorporation, in which the 
double elusiveness of the lost object (not only missing but also ambiguously 
delineated) is translated back into the terms of self-definition.  
The melancholic ‘knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’ 
(245); in other words, not only does he suffer the epistemological uncertainty of not 
knowing the limits of the lost object, but he suffers, additionally, the inconvenience of 
having to make room, in some sense to become, this ill-defined other.  Here we 
glimpse the becoming of oneself through irregular imbrication with others.  And we 
find a complementary process at work in the ‘On Narcissism’ paper when Freud 
offers us the imprecise formulation of a ‘new psychical action’ to be added to the 
auto-erotic instincts, ‘in order to bring about narcissism’. (ON, 77). Although it is 
clear that the self can only conceive of itself through the supplement of the outside 
(where the ‘new’ resides), it remains fundamentally unclear what form this self will 
take.  
It will become apparent across this volume that both of Freud’s papers return 
us to the intricacies of ego-formation, but there is no easy consensus regarding their 
implications for clinical practice, or for culture more broadly. That said, all the 
chapters in this volume return to metapsychology to interrogate its value for social 
thought. In the century since the papers were composed, narcissism and melancholia 
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have crossed the psycho-social divide in a variety of ways. To begin with narcissism: 
whereas psychoanalysis has always been equipped (though not necessarily inclined) 
to appreciate the normalcy of narcissistic fantasy and to speak of the necessity of 
healthy narcissism, within the sociological landscape this has not always been the 
case. When we look to the sociological literature we don’t find many positive 
appraisals of the narcissist. Finding a high point –more probably a low point– in 
Christopher Lasch’s damning attack on the New (American) Narcissist of the 1970s, 
narcissism became, for a while, the prevalent metaphor for the crisis in contemporary 
Western culture, and a place-holder for all manner of malaise: impoverished social 
relations, a weak public culture, permissive or confessional politics, and the triumph 
of the therapeutic (Lasch, 1979). It is fair to say that narcissism’s currency became so 
embroiled with the lamentations of this mid-to-late twentieth-century cultural 
criticism that the pleasures of narcissistic seduction, and the possibilities of 
narcissistic sociability acknowledged by Freud were almost entirely overlooked.4  
Commentaries on this discursive history have tended to identify narcissism as 
the dominant cultural diagnosis of Western society from the period of the 1970s to the 
1990s, following which there was a discernible turn to melancholia (Frosh 2016; 
Jacobsen 2016; Walsh 2015). As Frosh narrates it ‘narcissism was perhaps the term of 
choice for examining the problem of forging relationships that feel meaningful in the 
context of rapid change and neo-liberal expansions; then melancholia was (and is) 
drawn on to conceptualize the challenge of confronting loss and colonial theft […]’ 
                                                
4	Freud’s	identifies	numerous	narcissistic	figures	that	embody	a	positive	social	attraction	for	the	




(2016, 1). Acknowledging that the mourning and melancholia framework was 
deployed as a category of social analysis as early as 1974 in the Mitscherliches’ 
seminal text The Inability to Mourn, it is true to say that the new millennium brought 
with it a renewed appetite for melancholia. As Frosh suggests, this often took place 
within the context of decolonising critique; for example, Paul Gilroy’s writing on 
postcolonial melancholia, which redirected the work of the Mitscherliches by positing 
the melancholic’s disavowal of loss and resulting self-hatred as a structural model for 
thinking about the British response to the end of empire (2005, 87-88). It is further 
notable that in the year 2000, David L. Eng could observe that, Fanon aside, ‘little 
[had] been written on the question of racial difference and melancholia’ until the 
emergence of work by Ann Anlin Cheng and José Esteban Muñoz – today it is fairly 
stated that racial melancholia studies comprises an academic field in its own right. 5  
This important shift from the almost-default Americanism of mid-century 
critiques of narcissism to the more recent use of melancholy within critical-
postcolonial and race studies, has been accompanied by a further discursive 
rehabilitation of melancholia through feminist and queer scholarship (notably Judith 
Butler 1997, 2004, 2005; and Douglas Crimp 2002). Significantly, the use of the 
mourning and melancholia framework here has been less concerned to diagnose as 
pathological cultural disavowals of loss (e.g. the British denial of a changing world 
order), than to detect the operation of melancholia within the formation of critical 
subjects. If narcissism and melancholia have both conventionally been taken to 
                                                
5 Eng is citing Cheng’s 1997 article ‘The Melancholy of Race’, and Muñoz’s article of the same year 
‘Photographies of Mourning: Melancholia and Ambivalence in Van Der Zee, Mapplethorpe, and 
Looking for Langston’. In addition to Cheng’s subsequent monograph The Melancholy of Race (2001), 
we might now add to this roster of names: David Eng & Shinhee Han (2000), Ranjana Khanna (2003), 
Paul Gilroy (2005), Derek Hook (2014), Jermaine Singleton (2015).  
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signify rigidity, symptomatic of a closed economy of desire, then queer melancholia 
is more readily associated with modes of openness and not-knowing that correlate to 
expressions of ambivalence. The melancholic turn, suggests Butler, returning our eye 
to the metapsychological level, is the process by which ‘one makes of oneself an 
object for reflection; in the course of producing one’s alterity, one becomes 
established as a reflexive being’ (1997, 22). Through this reflexivity all cultural 
diagnostic practices are called into question, most tellingly those patrician critiques 
which would seek to denounce so-called ‘identity politics’ on the grounds of 
narcissism, whilst at the same time disavowing their own processes of identification 
(i.e. those critics – mostly men –  who uphold the faith in the impersonality of the 
social order while refusing to interrogate the privilege of their own subject positions 
within it). The ascendency of melancholia more recently is of a piece with the need 
for a political language that addresses the themes of displacement and dispossession. 
The question which the melancholic subject never directly asks herself, but which she 
carries around with her at all times, what have I incorporated in order to be? (or, 
what amorphous lost object occupies the space of myself?) is nonetheless posed 
through the reflexivity of her actions and expressions. Even if she doesn’t resolve 
upon fixed critical positions (the diagnosis of all society), the queer melancholic 
generates critical practices.  
Moving away from the generality of negative critique, then, recent attempts to 
think metapsychologically about such terms as hospitality, exile, border-control, and 
parasitism – including those collected in the essays here – have tended to draw from 
art, literature and other cultural forms to describe the intimate politics of inclusion and 
exclusion. This is not to discount broad structural analyses of melancholic (or 
narcissistic) societies undertaken in the mode of the Mitscherliches and Gilroy, but it 
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is to admit a different point of emphasis. Butler’s focus is on melancholia as the 
‘mechanism by which the distinction between internal and external worlds is 
instituted’: it creates a ‘variable boundary between the psychic and the social […]’ 
(171). Though this ‘variable boundary’ is described here in spatial terms, it must also 
be considered temporally in recognition of the shifting relations between the past, the 
present and the future. These shifting horizons will have further implications for our 
understanding of community. Often consigned to the past within modern social 
critique (and reduced to a fantasy object of nostalgia), it is our ambition in this 
volume to recover community’s character as both interstitial and intermittent. By 
attempting to address these characteristics, one inevitably finds oneself occupying the 
‘variable boundary’ in often-uncomfortable ways. As we’ve already suggested, we 
prefer to view this uncertain occupation as both melancholic and narcissistic, insisting 
that, minimally, these terms can be productively confused. The ‘new psychical 
mechanism’, which for Freud makes narcissism possible, might also be conceived as 
the means by which the embodied query of melancholia – what have we lost? – will 




‘If a community is based on agreement upon a few cardinal points’, Freud once wrote, 
‘it is obvious that people who have abandoned that common ground will cease to 
belong to it’ (1925, 53). When we’re informed, in this fashion, that something is 
‘obvious’, it’s good practice to pause for thought. Let’s, for now, bracket any desire to 
know the context of Freud’s common-sense statement, and simply put it to work as a 
provocation for our ongoing discussion. In doing so, we will approach a series of 
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questions to be borne in mind over the course of the volume: for example, what types 
of community are imaginable when the cardinal points of agreement are put under 
strain? How do non-consensual dynamics – antagonism and dissent – shape the 
formation of a community’s self-image such that belonging can be negotiated across 
uncommon ground? And, how is the relationship between the (isolable) figure and 
(common) ground unsettled and resettled by acts of ‘abandonment’?  
We can note that Freud’s casual formulation positions the individual, through 
her action of abandoning the common ground, as turning her back on the community; 
in a mode of self-imposed excommunication, it is the one who abandons the many.  
More resonant to readers of contemporary critical theory, however, might be an 
inversion of this dynamic wherein the common ground is pulled out from under the 
feet of particular (isolable) figures, displacing them from a state of prior belonging, or 
barring a priori their access to a given site of community. If to hold something in 
common is also to be held by it, then the risk prevails of being mishandled, dropped, 
shunted aside, or let fall through the proverbial net. The themes of precarity, 
dispossession, and exilic subjectivities, having been brought to the fore in much 
recent critical discourse, focus our attention on the edges of community – frontier-
sites where the contingencies of the ‘always already’ contested claims of identity and 
belonging are heightened.  
Axiomatic to any psychosocially oriented analysis of community is an 
appreciation of how the identity of the ‘in-group’ is achieved through the position of 
the ‘outsider’, how, in other words, that which is located beyond a given site of 
belonging is nonetheless vital as the ‘constitutive outside’ to the positive term of 
reference. The familiarity of this logic should not blind us to the multiplicity of its 
operations – operations that, one way or another, return us to the question of 
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identification. If, as Stuart Hall reminds us, identification ‘turns out to be one of the 
least well-understood concepts’, it is perhaps because of the disarming readiness with 
which we are inclined to understand it: ‘In common sense language, identification is 
constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared 
characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural 
closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation’. Hall argues 
against the ‘natural’ stability of group identity: identification, he writes, is ‘a 
construction, […] – always ‘in process’ […] the total meaning it suggests is, in fact, a 
fantasy of incorporation’. In language that reminds us of the Lorde poem with which 
we began, Hall tells us that identification necessarily entails ‘too much’ or ‘too little’,  
[there is] ‘never a proper fit, a totality’ (1996, 2-3). As with Lorde’s act of poesis – ‘I 
want to make you / more and less / a part / from my self’ – acts of identification 
produce unstable boundaries.   
A psychoanalytic appreciation of identification as a process, then, opens-up 
the ‘natural closure of solidarity’ by demonstrating how even the most foundational of 
identifications (or rather, especially the most foundational - think Oedipus) are rifted 
by ambivalence, the force of which becomes a ‘precondition of the institution of any 
identification’ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 207). Psychoanalysis postulates a human 
subject constituted through identifications formed in response to the simultaneous and 
at times inseparable coexistence of opposing emotional attitudes – primarily, love and 
hate. These arche-antonyms, however, require scrutiny lest the famous ‘conflict due 
to ambivalence’ they provoke be taken as the resting point of an analysis rather than 
its beginning.6  
                                                
6	Identified	 as	 a	 foundational	 psychical	 conflict	 that	 can	 inspire	 a	 vast	 range	 of	 defensive	
responses,	‘conflict	due	to	ambivalence’	is	a	favored	coinage	across	Freud’s	work.		
	 16	
In her highly influential project of refiguring psychoanalytic ideas and 
terminology, Sara Ahmed encourages her readers to consider identifications as ‘forms 
of alignment’: ‘thinking of identification as a form of alignment’ she says ‘shows us 
how identifications involve dis-identifications or an active ‘giving up’ of other 
possible identifications’ (2014, 52). The orienting strategy here, invaluable for 
underscoring the translatability of psychoanalytic theory into a contemporary cultural 
politics, is to analyse the means through which bodies are constructed in (and against) 
contingent, historical discourses such that they come to be (dis)aligned with certain 
other bodies. Following Freud in considering the ‘relationship between ego formation 
and community’, Ahmed writes:   
 
The ego is established by intimating the lost object of love; it is based on a 
principle of a likeness or resemblance or of becoming alike.  However, I 
would argue that love does not pre-exist identification (just as hate does not 
pre-exist dis-identification); so it is not a question of identifying with those we 
love and dis-identifying with those we hate. Rather, it is through forms of 
identification that align this subject with this other, that the character of the 
loved is produced as ‘likeness’ in the first place. […] (2014, 52) 
 
We are being asked to scrutinize how liking and likeness are linked. There is no 
inevitable order of play that aligns degrees of emotion (on a spectrum of love to hate) 
with the characteristics of resemblance (on a spectrum of sameness to difference). 
Rather, the force of the emotion does the work of producing the object it is regarded 
as being a response to: ‘What is at stake in the emotional intensities of love and hate’ 
writes Ahmed, ‘is the production of the effect of likeness and unlikeness as 
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characteristics that are assumed to belong to the bodies of individuals’ (Ibid.).  Or, as 
she puts it elsewhere, ‘likeness is an effect of proximity or contact, which is then 
“taken up” as a sign of inheritance’ (2006, 123). This duly troubles commonsensical 
or naïve psychologistic accounts that posit a ‘natural’ causation between non-
resemblance and antagonistic emotion – in other words accounts that leave un-
interrogated the discursive techniques that produce the homology between ‘stranger’ 
and ‘danger’.  
In our view, it is a staple of psychoanalytic enquiry to wonder at what point, and 
under what conditions, we might get to know what we are like. The language of 
psychoanalysis, extrapolated from the clinic, permits a detailed examination of the 
boundaries which construct and challenge likenesses. Specifically, this takes place 
though careful reading of the complex practices of (dis)identification at the heart of 
ego-formation (at both individual and group levels), and the associated mechanisms 
of defence, for example: introjection, incorporation, projective-identification, and 
splitting. Of importance to the title terms of this volume is an appreciation for how 
these various mechanisms allow us to describe the operation of two related fantasies: 
fantasies of distinction (or separation), and fantasies of unboundedness (or merging). 
It is a familiar analytic strategy to diagnose within the melancholic’s nostalgia for a 
lost golden age, as well as the narcissist’s self-aggrandizing fantasy of coherence, the 
dangerous illusion of internal homogeneity. Well-worn critiques of such imaginary 
identifications or cultural fantasies, provoke another question, however: namely, is 
every expression of commonality reducible to a mechanism of defence? Although 
‘community’ might sounds old-fashioned or unredeemably localist in an age of state 
politics and the formations of mass-society, the term remains useful, nonetheless, for 
how it registers the indefiniteness of identification: the everyday spatial practices 
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which produce ruptures or apertures within any given enclosure, signaling the 
potential for movement of members ‘in’ and ‘out’ of community, as well as the 
temporal intermittencies which necessarily structure the way different people come to 
hold something, or nothing, in common.  
It is perhaps worth stressing, then, that in exposing the fantasy element involved 
in the conception of a commonality around which solidarities and allegiances are 
declared, the intention is not to dismiss the need (or simply the circumstance) for its 
construction; rather it’s precisely to focus attention on how such identifications get 
made – both the motivations for them (historical, social, psychological), and the 
mechanisms of their production (historical, social, psychological). It is an assumption 
of this work that a psychoanalytic lens does not only lend itself to the third of these 
parenthetical terms. Highlighting the requirement to conceive the interplay of the 
psychic with the social as a profoundly relational affair, Diana Fuss states that 
‘identification names the entry of history and culture into the subject’ (3). To speak of 
narcissistic or melancholic identifications is thus to use the tools of psychoanalysis to 
detail the why and the how of identificatory processes and practices – that is, to 
discern the motivations and mechanisms through which history and culture come to 
enter the subject from the so-called ‘outside’. The psychosocial tenor of enquiry 
represented across the chapters in the volume foregrounds the need for sophisticated 
thinking about the valence of ‘inside’ / ‘outside’ terminology as both necessary-
impossible conceptual schemas relating to the theorization of the unconscious, and as 
utterances that enact the truth of lived experiences, such as being cast out of, 
imprisoned within, or living on the edge of society. 
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Now that we’ve begun to outline some of the formative concerns that accompany our 
title terms, we can look further into Freud’s comment regarding the obviousness of 
the rules of community: ‘If a community is based on agreement upon a few cardinal 
points, it is obvious that people who have abandoned that common ground will cease 
to belong to it’ (1925, 53). To be fair, Freud’s unusually straightforward statement, 
does not come from one of his explicit theorisations on group psychology, or the 
nature of the social bond, rather the occasion is autobiographical – at least, as 
autobiographical as Freud was prepared to be.7  He is reflecting on psychoanalysis’s 
strength as an international movement to withstand the secession of some of its most 
eminent members, including Alfred Adler and C. G. Jung, in the adolescent years of 
the new century (1911-13). The cardinal point abandoned by both men was the 
importance of sexuality (infantile sexuality and the Oedipus Complex for Jung; 
sexuality per se for Adler).  That the dissenters could not hold to a belief in the force 
of a formative psychosexual life signaled the undoing of their ties with the 
psychoanalytic community. On Freud’s direction, the separation settlement permitted 
neither to use the name ‘psycho-analysis’ to refer to their work. Here is Freud, writing 
in its direct aftermath about the case of Adler:  
Then Adler took a step for which we are thankful; he severed all connection 
with psycho-analysis, and gave his theory the name of ‘Individual 
Psychology’. There is room enough on God's earth, and anyone who can has a 
perfect right to potter about on it without being prevented; but it is not a 
desirable thing for people who have ceased to understand one another and 
have grown incompatible with one another to remain under the same roof. 




Adler's ‘Individual Psychology’ is now one of the many schools of 
psychology which are adverse to psycho-analysis and its further development 
is no concern of ours. (1914a, 52)  
 
With Freud’s blessing, then, Adler (and the Adlerians) were left to ‘potter about’ 
[herumtummle8] with matters more trifling, we infer, than ‘psycho-analysis’. The 
extent to which the severing that Freud speaks of here was more bloody than benign 
has been thoroughly addressed by the many chroniclers of the field: for one, the 
Adlerians did not immediately renounce the subject-designation psycho-analysis, 
rather the establishment of Adler’s ‘Society for Free Psychoanalytic Investigation’ 
was so named in response to the unfreedom he experienced in attempting to challenge 
the cardinal points of the Freudian science (Makari, 281).   
When writing the official autobiographical account of the formative divisions, 
Freud is compelled to defend himself against the charge of intolerance: as he lists the 
men whose enduring loyalty and friendship he (and his science) have enjoyed, the 
numbers stack-up in his favour. He ventures that ‘an intolerant man, dominated by an 
arrogant belief in his own infallibility, would never have been able to maintain his 
hold upon so large a number of intellectually eminent people, especially if he had at 
                                                
8 It is possible that James Strachey’s rendering of herumtummle as ‘to potter about’ misses the dig in 
Freud’s language; alternative translations such as ‘to romp’ or ‘to mess about’ perhaps give a better 
sense of the sexual component which Freud sneakily attributes to Adler’s new freedom.	[Es ist soviel 
Platz auf Gottes Erde und es ist gewiß berechtigt, daß sich jeder, der es vermag, ungehemmt auf ihr 
herumtummle, aber es ist nicht wünschenswert, daß man unter einem Dach zusammenwohnen bleibe, 
wenn man sich nicht mehr versteht und nicht mehr verträgt.] (GW, X: 95-6). 
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his command as few practical attractions as I [Freud] had’ (1925, 53).9 This is a 
delicate statement indeed: part bashful (I have few practical attractions), part boastful 
(I have few practical attractions, and yet…). It keeps us wondering as to the quality of 
Freud’s ‘hold’ on the members of the surrounding community, and the means through 
which it was maintained.  Precisely because Freud’s character remains on trial here, 
his defence against the charge of intolerance is made from a personal perspective (I’m 
not an intolerant man). However, the point he wishes to stress is that Adler and Jung 
lost their place at the psychoanalytic table due to irreconcilable disagreements of a 
scientific nature:  the supposition being that questions of character are superfluous to 
the work of a science whose job is not to extend a tolerant inclusivity to research 
programmes that are incompatible with the ‘cardinal points’ of the field. This suggests 
that whilst accusations of intolerance on the part of the man may be hard for the 
scientist to stomach, the idea of an intolerant science is less troublesome because it 
indicates that the field in question is sufficiently secure in its identity to pronounce 
with certitude what belongs outside of it. 
 But of course, psychoanalysis itself undermines this very logic with its 
persistent reminders that questions of character can never be left aside! Nowhere is 
this more obvious than in the boundary disputes that defined psychoanalysis’s early 
institutionalization – who’s in, who’s out; according to what theoretical and 
methodological principles were the lines of exclusion to be drawn; and what forms of 
                                                
9 Strachey	has	translated	the	German	verb	fesseln	which	connotes	both	captivation	and	tying-up	
as	‘to	hold’.	 	Perhaps	there	is	a	stronger	sense	of	the	charismatic,	or	at	least	libidinally	charged,	
quality	 of	 the	 hold	 in	 question	 in	 Freud’s	 original	 expression.	 	 [Aber	 ich	 darf	 wohl	 für	 mich	
geltend	 machen,	 daß ein intoleranter und vom Unfehlbarkeitsdünkel beherrschter Mensch niemals 
eine so große Schar geistig bedeutender Personen an sich hätte fesseln können, zumal wenn er über 
nicht mehr praktische Verlockungen verfügte als ich] (GW, XVI: 80).   
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community policing were to be deployed to safeguard the ‘homogeneity of the 
core’?10  The developmental tale of psychoanalysis, which we can hardly do more 
than allude to here, is wonderfully intricate, with the play and counter play of 
transferences restaging rivalries and opening old wounds. That the discipline’s 
identity is impossible to separate from the identity of its founder, accounts for why so 
many of the so-called scientific critiques of psychoanalysis continue to take a 
profoundly ad-hominem turn.  
It cannot escape anyone’s attention here that we are once more attending to the 
grounds of narcissism. If narcissism marks the point at which the distinction between 
subject and object fails to hold, then perhaps it is legitimate to call psychoanalysis a 
narcissistic science. Similarly, psychoanalysis has often been conceived as a 
melancholic science due to its enduring concern with the lost object, the misplaced 
affect, and its theorization of belatedness -  all elements reinforced by the discipline’s 
own apparent cultural belatedness as a European bourgeois science at the end of the 
age of the European bourgeoisie (Baraitser, 2012: 224). The point of most enduring 
interest though, is whether such a double designation can only be a slur against both 
the science and the scientist(s), or whether it can stand as a general and 
insurmountable truth about the scientific discourse as such.  
In addition to naming infantile sexuality, Freud would go on to adduce several 
other cardinal points as being foundational to his discipline: the ‘assumption that there 
are unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of resistance and 
repression’ as well as the facticity of the transference. ‘No one who cannot accept 
                                                
10 In a letter to his trusted ally Lou Andreas-Salomé, Freud resolved to ‘hold onto the homogeneity of 
the core’ of his scientific discipline lest it become ‘something else’ (Gay, 216) – this after having 
frankly admitted his personal opinion of Adler ‘he is a loathsome individual’ (Freud, 1914c: 19).  
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them all should count himself a psycho-analyst’, he states (1923, 247).  Who gets to 
count (zählen) as a community member is determined by allegiance to the founding 
principles of the science, which, in turn, become the principles that safeguard the 
Freudian body-politic. We might note that this business of counting is not altogether 
incidental, for when an association has grown from one, to several, then on to a 
known number of bodies that can still meet around a committee table, the task of 
counting seems to be manageable. But once the numbers exceed the boardroom, the 
lecture hall, the town square, or indeed the boundaried polis, counting becomes more 
problematic. There is of course the difficult exercise of tallying-up the numbers, 
finding reliable measures to ensure that votes get counted such that something like the 
general will can be given form. Additionally, there is the question of who is count-
worthy: whose vote matters, or, indeed, who is even eligible to vote? Fundamentally, 
however, if number remains of significance to Freud, and the persistence of quantity 
poses a problem worth considering, it is never simply a matter of political 
representation, of casting votes to establish an arithmetic majority. The fact that 
others count, doesn’t tell us how they count. Counting matters for psychoanalysis 
because ‘one’ is always ‘more and less’ (Lorde) than itself, a confusion between self 
and other which makes adding-up a difficult business. The negotiation of 
psychoanalytic authority likewise, and despite Freud’s retrospective claim to the 
contrary, is based upon acts of identification which don’t resolve wholly on cardinal 
points. Indeed, at an historical moment of scientific schism (precipitated by the 
breaking of ties with Adler and Jung), and when the European world was about to 
descend into a catastrophic war, Freud withdrew to write two papers about how every 




In his 1967 book The Sociological Tradition, Robert Nisbet pointed out that from 
Auguste Comte on, the ‘social’ in the sociological was firmly wedded to the moral 
component of the concept ‘community’. ‘[T]he referent of the ‘social’’, he wrote, 
‘was almost invariably the communal. Communitas, not societas with its more 
impersonal connotations, is the real etymological source of the sociologist’s use of the 
word ‘social’ in his studies. […].’. For Comte, according to Nisbett, ‘the ghost of 
traditional community hovers over […] sociology’ (56). 
We can find an equally definitive articulation of sociology’s haunting by 
community in Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 account of the move from Gemeinschaft 
(community) to Gesellschaft (civil society). Tonnies’s narrative is often designated a 
scriptural moment in the history of sociological thinking, announcing an abiding 
anxiety with the transformation of public space and related modes of association. Of 
course, anxiety and the lost object of community go hand in hand; and, we might 
quip, that the former is all the more obstinate when the latter was never present in the 
first place. However, we are not concerned in this work to re-diagnose a structural 
nostalgia at the heart of the sociological discipline (Stauth & Turner 1988, Walsh 
2015), or to rehearse the relation between elitist critiques of mass society and the 
melancholic disposition of the critic (see Wendy Brown, 1999). The idea that 
sociological thinking has been propelled by the impulse to mourn the social bonds of 
community is well established, as is the myth of premodern coherence and stability 
that such a mourning requires.  
Benedict Anderson (1983) has shown, for example, in his account of the 
emergence of modern nations as ‘imagined communities’, that such myths continue to 
operate in powerful ways. Anderson’s famous illustration of the tomb of the unknown 
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soldier points to the foundational melancholia of national communities, which owe 
their persistence, in the face of Marxist or liberal critique, to both their strong feeling 
for death, and strategic ignorance about what has died (the soldier should not be 
identified). Anderson points us towards a deep social structure of elegy, always 
mediated through changing technologies (new print media in the 15th and 16th 
centuries; the internet today), which helps inaugurate a group-ego among people who 
have never met in person – whose proximity is imaginary. Needless to say, such 
national formations are not always benign. History is littered with quasi-religious 
national movements –from European fascism to the proliferation of protectionisms 
around the globe today– which demonstrate the violence of identification by securing 
borders against immigration, suppressing internal dissent, and annexing foreign space. 
The value of Anderson’s analysis, however, and the kernel of his soft defence of 
nationalism as a diffuse political force, is that the general form of any given national 
imaginary might contain a multiplicity of identifications. In other words, because the 
tomb is anonymous, its specific contents remain always undefined, and therefore open 
to historical change. 
At the risk of rehearsing the obvious, it is worth adding here that neo-liberal 
critiques of nationalism do not necessarily circumvent the dangers of reproducing 
securitized and exclusionary forms of identity –globalization produces a wealth of 
gated ‘communities’. Furthermore, following Zygmunt Bauman (2001), instead of 
regarding the multiple minoritarian communities which emerge within supra-national 
and neo-imperial space as the avatars for a Habermasian conversation in the public 
sphere, they can be read symptomatically. Whilst the organization of cultural 
difference within a ‘progressive’ liberal politics might be seen as straightforwardly 
positive, Bauman suggests (as do many critics of the neoliberal economy) that such 
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apparent diversity disguises systemic assimilation and exclusion. The failed promise 
of multiculturalism is that the terms of universal citizenship which it infers, and which 
are necessary in order to open the possibility of contest and consent between ‘equals’, 
are fatally beset by economic unevenness, unacknowledged and unknown historical 
exclusions, and unpredictable cultural fragmentations. In this way, the delineation of 
different communities, imagined as being somehow in conversation, can also, 
paradoxically, mark a profound failure of social communication.  
Drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben and Jean Luc Nancy, among others, 
we can attribute this failure of communication –the failure to arrive properly at inter-
subjective recognition– to the limitations of enacting politics in a representational 
mode. Community understood according to the rule of all of its members possessing, 
and being represented by, an essential or definitive characteristic (a named ethnicity, a 
skin colour, an avowed creed, a shared myth of origin) misses, according to both these 
writers, the true precarity of what it is to be in common. Agamben in The Coming 
Community, envisages community unbound by any common property, identity, or 
essence, holding out the possibility of ‘co-belong[ing] without any representable 
condition of belonging”. What he calls the ‘whatever [qualunque] singularites’ of 
community ‘cannot form a societas because they do not possess any identity to 
vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition’ (Agamben, 1993: 
86). He points us here towards a politics of dispossession – a dispossession that can 
somehow be shared, or identified with. To be in common is not to belong to a 
predefined enclosure, but rather to enact the possibilities of an irreducible singularity 
coming to be itself. This repeats some familiar notes from the Freudian 
metapsychology discussed above, where the unconscious incorporation of loss and the 
‘new psychical action’ of ego formation can militate against a closed representation 
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of the subject. It also returns our attention to the matter of counting: Agamben’s 
“whatever singularity” can never be simply ‘one’, where one is the abstracted and 
countable quality that determines the political representation only of those subjects 
who are already seen to count.  
Nancy uses an equally apposite terminology in his study The Inoperative 
Community when he writes that ‘Being in common means […] no longer having, in 
any form, in any empirical or ideal place, […] a substantial identity, and sharing this 
(narcissistic) “lack of identity” (Nancy, xxxviii). This shared ‘narcissistic lack’ might 
also be termed an unconsciously common melancholia; and it is significant that at the 
same time as extolling such a melancholic structure, Nancy is also concerned to 
challenge the melancholia of the sociological script. Community does not designate a 
premodern Gemeinschaft intimacy, he argues, but rather gestures to an intimacy yet to 
come.  
 
‘[S]ociety was not built on the ruins of a community. It emerged from the 
disappearance or the conservation of something -tribes or empires- perhaps 
just as unrelated to what we call ‘community’ as to what we call ‘society’. 
So that community, far from being what society has crushed or lost, is what 
happens to us – question, waiting, event, imperative – in the wake of 
society.’ (Nancy, 11)  
 
The re-temporalisation of community implicit in both Nancy and Agamben’s works 
signals a break with representational historical narratives in favour of a politics of 
process and co-presence-ing, as well as of contingency. For both writers, the 
prepositional inflections are highly important (more important that the subject itself): 
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being in and being with indicate the acts of being placed that produce community. 
These communities are not ideal enclosures, but rather, through the operations of 
division (being in) and relation (being with), they converge always upon the question 
of borders. Which is to say, community takes place in temporally and spatially 
unsecured circumstances.  
 
This is a good point at which to return to Freud, and specifically to his 1921 text 
‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’, wherein he explicitly connects 
narcissistic identification to the politics of being with others (Gemeingeist). Freud’s 
paper aims, in the most general terms, to explain the fluctuating feelings of 
omnipotence and self-divestiture within the narcissistic dynamics of homosocial 
identification: an institution of fellow-feeling mediated through the idealized figure of 
a leader. By Freud’s account, the politics of any given community implies a form of 
seduction between the leader and the led: horizontal relations are only made possible 
through the social bond tied on the vertical axis. In other words, investment in the 
authority ‘above’ permits the forging of bonds between subjects positioned laterally 
(it’s through my father that I may come to love my brother). The authority to which 
the group is libidinally tied is given form through a particular figure; as Philip Rieff 
puts it, ‘authority’, for Freud, ‘is always personified’ (235).  
At face value, this positions Freud at some distance from contemporary 
demands to develop an ethics of community, not least because of his insistence that it 
requires a hierarchical structure to develop a fraternal bond. Not only is Freud’s 
notional ‘band of brothers’ secured on a quasi war-footing, aligning themselves in 
tribal terms under the banner of the father, who is both alive and dead, but also, as 
Freud tells us explicitly in Totem and Taboo, the brothers’ task comprises the theft 
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and exchange of other bodies – specifically women.11 We can detect, then, that for 
Freud the anthropological structure persists symbolically in modern group formation 
(e.g. the mythic production of fraternity is isomorphic to the production of modern 
esprit de corps). Accordingly, we might join with Jacques Derrida and ask, ‘why 
privilege the brother over the sister, the female cousin, the daughter, the wife or the 
stranger, or the figure of anyone or whoever’ (see Matthews, 2016, 80). The common 
man, it may be said, is a dangerous reduction of community: though a reduction 
which may well be embedded in the word ‘community’ itself. 12  
Our suspicion is that Freud’s group psychology, secured through identification 
with the leader, does not pay sufficient attention to the specificity of different 
                                                
11 The condensed narrative that Freud offers in Totem and Taboo runs as follows: ‘Sexual desires do 
not unite men but divide them. Though the brothers had banded together in order to overcome 
their father, they were all one another's rivals in regard to the women. Each of them would have 
wished, like his father, to have all the women to himself. The new organization would have collapsed 
in a struggle of all against all, for none of them was of such overmastering strength as to be able to take 
on his father's part with success. Thus the brothers had no alternative, if they were to live together, 
but—not, perhaps, until they had passed through many dangerous crises—to institute the law 
against incest, by which they all alike renounced the women whom they desired and who had been 
their chief motive for despatching [sic] their father. In this way they rescued the organization which 
had made them strong—and which may have been based on homosexual feelings and acts, originating 
perhaps during the period of their expulsion from the horde’ (144).  
12	Though this is an obvious critique of Freud, Derrida is in fact interrogating the work of Georges 
Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Nancy. Indeed Nancy concedes, responding to Derrida’s query, that 
‘community’ does indeed resonate with Christian references to spiritual and brotherly love, which 
threaten to idealize and thereby cover-over the prepositional fragility of the ‘with’. A community of 
priestly brothers in transcendent identification with the father attain their ‘proximity and intimacy’ 
symbolically, without suffering what Nancy calls ‘removal’ – which is to say, the immanent, embodied 
discomfiture of sharing space. (For a fuller discussion of this debate, see Matthews, 80-81).	
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historical identifications. However, it’s still worth remaining with Freud’s text a little 
while longer, paying particular attention to the mechanisms of social attachment it 
details – not least because this theme will be returned to in several of the chapters in 
this volume. The crucial figure here is ‘the ego-ideal’, which, most straightforwardly, 
we are told, fulfills the role of ‘self-observation, moral conscience, the censorship of 
dreams, and the chief influence in repression’ (1921, 110). This entity is 
representative of ‘the ego divided, fallen apart into two pieces’ as a result of the 
melancholic incorporation of a lost object (109). As with many of Freud’s concepts, 
however, the ego-ideal is a piece of theory-in-motion, pointing both to the social and 
the metapsychological spheres.13 First, as a critical agency set up within the ego (the 
manifestation of the melancholic split within the ego between ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ 
components) the ego-ideal is transferred into the social through identification with the 
leader. Second, and moving back towards individual ego-formation, we find 
something slightly different – namely what Freud calls the ‘ideal-ego’, defined in ‘On 
Narcissism’ as the ‘target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the 
actual ego. […]  [In appearance it is] possessed of every perfection that is of value’ 
(94). The distinction between ideal ego (narcissistic admiration) and ego ideal 
(melancholic ambivalence) may seem a minor one, but, once perceived, it permits 
alternate readings of Freud’s paper (see also Wright; Bonnigal-Katz; and Watt 
below).  
In the more conventional reading, Freud’s group psychology depends on 
difference: the lost object/other, once incorporated, creates an ego divided, an ego 
which has to make room for the other within it. This conflict underwrites the ego-
                                                
13	Most	 obviously,	 within	 Freud’s	 corpus,	 the	 theorisation	 of	 the	 ego-ideal	 was	 set	 to	 receive	
further	redefinition	with	the	introduction	of	the	superego	in	1923.		
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ideal whose punitive function can only be consoled through an identification with an 
external figure: an identification in the world which imaginatively re-separates the 
self from the other. This results in a narcissistic politics of minor differences, in which 
a common identification – having certain qualities in common – is organized on the 
basis of an unconscious hostility to the other.  
On a second reading however, reading through the idea of the ‘ideal-ego’, we can 
apply narcissism much more radically to the phenomenon of group psychology. If the 
lost object unconsciously incorporated into the ego is the very image of the ego itself, 
then the predicament which results is not that of difference (the conflict between ego 
and incorporated object within the same psychic space) but of sameness (the enigma 
of having (re)incorporated my imagined self perfection). Leo Bersani has probably 
pushed this second reading the furthest, dissolving any fundamental distinction 
between narcissistic and object-libidinal attachments; taking seriously in other words, 
the thought that it is an original mourning for ourselves that motivates all of our 
identifications. Disputing the necessity for a punitive ego-ideal, or the inevitability of 
a tragic psycho-sexual conflict resolved through social splitting, Bersani proposes an 
alternative spatialisation of community, modeled upon the activity of cruising for 
sex.14 Defining cruising as ‘a nameless, identity-free contact –contact with an object I 
don’t know and certainly don’t love’– he provocatively insists that ‘contact’ should 
not ‘degenerate’ into an inter-subjective relationship. In other words, it is important 
that the object is not delineated in terms of identifiable difference, but rather is 
infiltrated by the enigma of sameness. Thus, in cruising, we move impersonally and 
                                                
14 Bersani takes his lead from Freud’s Group Psychology text: ‘It seems certain, writes Freud in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, “that homosexual love is far more compatible (than 
heterosexual love) with group ties, even when it takes the shape of uninhibited sexual impulsions – a 
remarkable fact, the explanation of which might carry us far”’ (Bersani, 2010: 49). 	
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anonymously through space, identifying our missing selves in the bodies of strangers. 
Sexual excitement, Bersani has written in The Culture of Redemption, is ‘both a 
turning away from others and a dying to the self,’ a paradox which establishes the 
terms of narcissistic sociability:  a withdrawal into the self which is yet a shattering of 
self-coherence through acts of sexual identification with others (1990, 45). Here what 
is in common is narcissism itself: the task of finding in others the self which will 
never be possessed. 	
Bersani’s is one especially ingenious example of post-Freudian community, 
which disputes the hierarchical and boundaried nature of Freud’s conception of group 
psychology (demonstrating a Freudian metapsychology that is more radical than 
many of its cultural applications would suggest). Of course we can acknowledge the 
limitations of his model of gay cruising for an application beyond its first context, 
specifically on the questions of scale (is the affective power of cruising determined by 
its status as minority pursuit?), and opportunity (is cruising for sex open to all?). It 
provides us, nonetheless, with a compelling notion of community as an itinerant 
‘counter public’. Indeed, this modern tradition of proposing counter publics, in order 
to contest and deliberately fragment dominant ‘public sphere’ discourse, has been led 
by feminist and queer theorists, including Nancy Fraser and Michael Warner, and has 
often explicitly drawn from Michel Foucault’s (1984 [1967]) influential idea of the 
‘heterotopia’. Heterotopias, according to Foucault, are ‘real’ sites of emplacement 
(e.g. boarding schools, cemeteries, ships), reserved for crises or transitions (e.g. 
adolescence, illness, old age, travel) which connect disparate ‘ordinary’ spaces, and 
which are connected to the public sphere without ever being only public. For 
Foucault, a heterotopia ‘presupposes a system of opening and closing that both 
isolates them and makes them penetrable,’ a characteristic he deems to be under threat 
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as sites of ‘transition’ are further transformed by modern institutions into states of 
‘deviation’; as the privatization (and increasing uniformity) of modern ‘public’ space 
reduces the possibilities for heterotopic crises (7, 5).  With this cultural transformation 
in mind, and its corresponding politicization, much recent writing on counter publics 
has emphasized the ‘agitational’ quality of group formation, and the shifting terms of 
difference and sameness which determine the lines of inclusion. As Nancy Fraser puts 
it ‘on the one hand, [counter publics] function as spaces of withdrawal and 
regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds for 
agtitational activities directed toward wider publics’ (Fraser 1992: 124).  The terms of 
‘withdrawal’ and ‘regroupment’ suggest a necessary narcissistic investment of libido 
into the ego: a community grows its practices through turning its back on the 
dominant discourse. At the same time, however, this ego-investiture calls into 
question its own boundaries: the community’s ‘agitational’ activities ensure that its 
self-identifications are never fulfilled.  
The summoning of everyday practices is particularly important in this context, 
especially if we want to understand why counter publics are not reducible to advocacy 
groups, directly representing the interests of one marginal identity to the political 
centre. Indeed, it is the activism of ‘taking place’, and using things in common, that is 
stressed in most contemporary revivals of ‘commons’ discourse (Harvey 2011, Tyler 
2013). For example, writing about the eviction of gypsies and travelers from the Dale 
Farm site in Essex, in the UK in 2011, as well the forms of resistance that emerged at 
the same time, Imogen Tyler connects the question of the common land to the practice 
of commoning. ‘Many [such] social and political movements draw inspiration from 
the philosophy of the commons and explicitly understand their politics as a politics of 
occupation and their activism as forms of commoning against (capitalist) forms of 
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enclosure’ (Tyler, 2013: 151).  The ecological tenor of this language is not 
adventitious, returning us, as it does, to the prepositional logic encountered above, of 
being ‘in’ and being ‘with’, and the inescapable question of resources: how will 
scarcity or lack get distributed? The implication is that political resistance is also, 
inevitably, a precarious community-building endeavor.  In fact, it seems that one of 
the impossible, though compelling challenges of thinking community today is the 
requirement that we both find a way to withdraw from state-run ‘society’ in order to 
register and resist its structure, and at the same time learn how to take place in social 
space with others.  
Ours would not be a psychoanalytic account of community if we failed to 
notice that we’re gesturing here towards a formula for paranoid sociability: at once 
fantasizing retreat or disappearance from the established social-symbolic network and 
actively engaging with the messy entanglements of the social scene. Engin Isin (2004) 
has offered ‘the neurotic citizen’ as the dominant character type of the post 9/11 era, 
suggesting that ‘anxiety about the Other […] has been articulating itself [for several 
decades] through various discourses on the border […] their disappearance, fluidity, 
malleability, porousness, penetrability and smartness’. His suggestion is that the 
border itself has become ‘neuroticized’ as ‘part of a larger domain of practices 
through which the neurotic citizen has formed’ (231-2).  The words ‘porousness’ and 
‘penetrability’ evoke Freud’s exemplary narcissist, paranoiac, and psychotic, Judge 
Schreber. But as well as being reminded that narcissism itself sits as a border-concept 
between neurosis and psychosis within Freudian nosology, Isin’s thesis on border-
anxiety invites us to think about the unique challenges of the contemporary situation. 
Whilst the American President Donald Trump’s threat to ‘build a wall’ between the 
U.S. and Mexico is an exaggerated (and exaggeratedly narcissistic) iteration of old 
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geo-political fantasies, the rise of the internet has surely exacerbated questions of 
scale and ontological distinction –pertaining to ego formation and permeability– such 
that they can appear as brand new problems. Resisting incorporation by the other, and 
learning to cooperate with others, can take place today, simultaneously, in both the 
virtual and physical worlds, and therefore has to be negotiated on two vastly different 
scales, with two vastly different notions of propinquity at play.15 There is no doubt 
that the contemporary question of community is haunted by the idea of the virtual 
world: millennial ‘narcissism’, ad hominem politics, the phenomenon of the echo 
chamber effect on social media –all undersigned, of course, by the melancholy of 
patrician critiques of new media.  
Allowing for these new and complex ways in which we have to think about 
being in and being with, and how community gets made, we can gather that much of 
the recent literature on counter publics, the commons and community, opposes 
representational politics with an affective politics of proximity (even if this means 
proximity through screens).16 Another way of putting this is to say that political 
community today does not directly infer Communism: it is not a direct attempt to take 
hold of and reorganize state power. The fundamental problem of being in common is 
not resolved by having, and representing to oneself and others, certain essential 
qualities or values; just as the awkward interpositions of ego formation will not 
resolve upon the idealism of an inter-subjective relationship. Accordingly, we can see 
community taking place, temporally and spatially, at unsecured borders where the 
                                                
15	See Calhoun (1998) for a pre-Millennium appraisal of ‘community without propinquity’ that warns 
against exaggerating the novelty of the Internet.	 
16	Nancy speaks of community as ‘literary communism’, the interruption of the myth of the one, which 
is not necessarily communicable – ‘no form of intelligibility or transmissibility is required of it’ – but 
which nonetheless constitutes a ‘work’ offered up for communication (73).		
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operations of interpellation and ambivalence, and the facticity of contingency, cut 
across any blandly utopic notion of the commons. Lauren Berlant has warned us 
against the undue ‘positivizing’ of commons discourse: 
 
Politics is also about redistributing insecurity, after all. So whatever else it is, 
the commons concept has become a way of positivizing the ambivalence that 
saturates social life about the irregular conditions of fairness. I’m not arguing 
against the desire for a smooth plane of likeness, but arguing that the 
attachment to this concept is too often a way of talking about politics as the 
resolution of ambivalence and the vanquishing of the very contingency of 
nonsovereign standing that is at the heart of true equality, where status is not 
worked out in advance or outside of relation. (2016, 395) 
 
What must be worked out through, and within ‘relation’, is the density of its affective 
life, replete with feelings of awkwardness, inconvenience, shame as well as pride, and 
even disgust. The attainment of ‘likeness’ is work, suggests Berlant, necessitating 
negotiations and acknowledgements which are negative as well as positive; 
identifications which collapse distances too soon to the point of merging, as well as 
preserve them too long to the point of indifference. This is the struggle of community: 
the work it takes to not assume that we are one; to aim at the ‘true equality’ Berlant 
speaks of, rather than at the presumptive equality among those we already know are 




Though by no means representing the same intellectual outlook, the chapters that 
follow attest to the ways in which the capaciousness of the terms narcissism and 
melancholia – connoting psychic structure, developmental stage, syndrome or 
disorder, cultural mood, political mode, and the possibility of strategic refusal – 
permit us to think rigorously, and in complex ways, about modern community.  
Chapter 2 begins with an explicit ‘rejection of Freud’s original theory of 
primary narcissism’.  Licensed by a reading of Melanie Klein and the Object 
Relations school of psychoanalysis, Michael Rustin argues for the ‘innate object-
relatedness’ of the self, with narcissism acting only as a secondary defence 
mechanism against a hostile environment. Rustin allows that defining the point at 
which the infant is able to determine between itself and others is profoundly 
ideological; and, consequently, he proposes a distinction between the hedonistic-
utilitarian (an ultimately capitalist) characterization of self-development, to which 
social relations are mere additions, and a welfare-state model of essential relatedness. 
By no means exempting psychoanalysis from the operations of capitalist systems of 
representation, neither does Rustin reduce the Freudian or Lacanian traditions to 
individualist philosophies – both, he concedes, are philosophies of relation. Yet he 
does see an importance difference between what he terms the ‘pessimism’ of Lacan, 
focusing always on the cultural and the linguistic, and the optimism of Klein, working 
to cultivate relations which nurture and support. Ranging broadly in his social 
examples through the Mitscherlichs and Gilroy, to contemporary social phenomena, 
Rustin presents the damaged states of narcissism and melancholia as general 
symptoms, which demand close, context-specific treatments.  
 Jay Watts’s chapter, ‘Narcissism Through the Digital Looking Glass’, while 
not a riposte to Rustin’s perspective does offer a compelling version of Lacanian 
	 38	
optimism with respect to our understanding of the digital world and ‘new media’.  
Watts pointedly revises ‘neo-Laschian’ critiques of digital space as determinate of 
pathological narcissism (symptomized by feelings of disembodiment and insecurity). 
By taking Lacan’s mirror phase where ‘the specular I turns into the social I’ and 
adapting it into the ‘Millennial’ culture of the selfie, Watts advises that we resist the 
temptation of the underdetermined narrative which sees narcissistic fantasy give way 
to mature object choice (Lacan, 1996: 98). We might focus instead, she suggests, on 
the productive and responsible conditions of play made possible by the internet.  The 
internet provides new models for enjoying ourselves together, unsecured by the 
patrician fantasy of ‘a stable, situated, superior relational self’.  Here, the clinical case 
study of Mohammed, a young Muslim immigrant to London, whose selfie-taking and 
online cruising (vaguely reminiscent of Bersani’s model mentioned above), models 
what she calls a ‘radical narcissism’.  Radical narcissism is the means by which 
Mohammed can transition out of a traditional set of cultural norms into a different 
world.  
 In chapter 4, Lynne Layton continues to apply psychoanalytic thought to 
media, specifically to the forms of identification the media permits, through a reading 
of David Fincher’s 1999 film Fight Club. Writing back to the moment of the late 70s, 
wherein the then ‘new’ Narcissist received his most forceful treatment from Lasch, 
Layton demonstrates how the seemingly constitutive link between capitalism and 
narcissism remains in need of further critical analysis today: Fincher’s film, and 
cultural productions like it, are read as symptomatic of ‘a social structure that splits 
autonomous from relational capacities and does so in support of a neoliberal, global 
order of consumer and finance capitalism’. Key to Layton’s analysis is an 
appreciation of the gendering of narcissism’s fundamental dialectic, with the 
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‘grandiose’ masculine pole connoting a ‘devaluation of the other […] with isolating 
defenses against merger’, and the ‘self-deprecating’ feminine pole connoting 
‘idealization of the other, and a defensive longing to merge and lose oneself in the 
other’. With this framework in mind, Layton surmises that neo-liberalism’s hallmark 
repudiation of dependency (the putatively feminine) is of a piece with the cultural 
denigration of particular gendered, classed, and racialized subject positions: if Fight 
Club stages the violence of white heterosexual masculinity, it ultimately proposes that 
its subjects’ ‘narcissistic wounds are best treated by shoring up male narcissism.’ 
We suggested above that the conceptual distinction between mourning and 
melancholia, as drawn by Freud, has been considered somewhat overdrawn by critics 
wishing to stress either the ‘madness’ of so-called normal mourning or, indeed, the 
‘normalcy’ of melancholia.  However, in his chapter ‘Melancholia, the Death Drive 
and Into the Wild’, Derek Hook makes the case for strengthening the distinction 
between the two psychical schemas. Hook is not alone amongst the writers in this 
volume in making plain the value of narcissism and melancholia for enriching both 
clinical and cultural thought around the phenomenon of psychosis, where the 
experienced security of psyche-soma borders is imperiled by the over-proximity of the 
object. Deploying a rereading of melancholia advanced by the Lacanian theorist 
Russel Grigg, Hook asks us to question whether we can think of melancholia 
otherwise than ‘within the parameters of the lost, resented and subsequently 
internalised object’. Central to this shift in focus, from the lostness of the object to the 
too muchness of the object, is Hook’s appreciation of the death drive.   The drive to 
remove oneself from life, not through active suicidality, but rather by ‘going off grid’ 
- endeavoring to exempt oneself from the network of symbolic relations through 
which we are named and placed - characterizes the clinical and cultural material 
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examined in this chapter. In addition to outlining key features of a case from his own 
practice, Hook offers a reading of Christopher McCandless, the American graduate in 
his early twenties who, as told by Jon Krakauer in his book Into the Wild, ‘dropped 
out of sight’, pursuing an itinerant life on the edge of society. In both instances 
considered, Hook identifies features of a melancholic subjectivity, including: 
‘difficulties in processing symbolic exchanges [and] a yearning for anonymity and 
disappearance’. With appropriate caution, we are directed to a consideration of the 
psychosocial dimensions of this melancholic portrait, and their implications for an 
understanding of community. Might the longing for self-sufficiency to the point of 
self-erasure that the two male subjects of Hook’s account share, be adequate grounds 
for a community? A community of narcissists, perhaps –eschewing the echoes of the 
social, as did the eponymous mythic hero. To successfully disappear oneself no doubt 
has a formative function (the Freudian ‘Fort-Da!’ game supports this), but might it 
also have a cultural urgency when the omniscience eyes of a surveillance society and 
the interminable memory of the internet are just two social symptoms of a world in 
which the ‘lost object’ insists on its re-presentation? 
In chapter 6, Dorothée Bonnigal-Katz also features the role of the death drive 
as central to her analysis of primary narcissism and melancholia. Proving the 
importance of metapsychological thinking for clinical work, Bonnigal-Katz offers the 
figure of ‘the monster in the mirror’ to capture the complex operations of the 
melancholic ego, which tend towards the seemingly ceaseless production and 
destruction of an impossible self-image. Following Freud, she reminds us that the 
nurturing object of the (m)other comprises a primary and conflictual border zone 
through which the marking of a bodily limit also entails an ‘unamendable loss’.  Key 
to her argument is the resurrection of infanticide as a necessary psychoanalytic 
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coordinate (‘infanticide is as structural as incest in the making of the human subject’), 
as well as its coupling with fantasies of maternal omnipotence: ‘like the gaze of the 
Medusa, the maternal gaze […] endows the budding subject with petrifying 
omnipotence, inscribing death, from the outset, as an inherent constituent of primary 
love’. Through a fascinating discussion of the Medusa myth, we are taken directly 
into the intensities of the clinical scene, wherein the eyes of the analyst and the patient 
meet to play a game of waiting. With an astute clinical focus, this chapter affirms 
Freud’s conviction that the clinical picture of melancholia is both ‘so interesting – and 
so dangerous’ (MM, 252).  
The next two chapters are both explicitly concerned with the constitutional 
violence of colonialism. Juliet B. Rogers in chapter 7 develops a version of the 
Mitscherlichs’ thesis concerning the cultural ‘inability to mourn’, applying it to the 
case of ‘Australia’, specifically to the constructed feeling of ‘white’ Australia today. 
According to Rogers, white Australia continues to protect itself from the shame of its 
racist constitution through two related displacements: the first, that of fantasizing a 
nostalgic object of Australia as it used to be when it was more ‘authentically’ white, 
before more recent waves of immigration (from Southern Europe, South America and 
East Asia); and the second, that of apologizing to the Indigenous Peoples for an 
historical act of expropriation. As Rogers suggests, liberal white Australia finds it 
easier to apologize to the Indigenous Peoples than to directly address the terms of the 
Australian Constitution, and the question of indigeneity it covers over. The 
constitutional document secures the essential ‘goodness’ of Australia: what it once 
was when it was more ‘white’; or what it is now as it apologizes for an historical 
crime. To challenge this document, then, is to disrupt the imaginary goodness of the 
Australian community, as well as the structural melancholia which underwrites it. 
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Detailing what is known as the ‘Black Process’, and the current move towards non-
indigenous ‘readiness’ to recognize the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Peoples, 
Rogers argues that the Constitution must be re-written, and, moreover, be seen to be 
re-writable. Only then can white Australia come to mourn, and move on from its self-
image as a unitary community possessing essentially virtuous qualities. 
 In ‘Dr Fanon on Colonial Narcissism and Anti-Colonial Melancholia’, Colin 
Wright  reconnects Fanon the psychiatrist to Fanon the anti-colonial revolutionary. He 
does so by detecting the mutations of narcissism and melancholia from Fanon’s early, 
Lacan-inspired text Black Skins White Masks (1986 [1952]), to the late writings on 
Algeria, specifically the essay ‘Colonial War and Mental Disorders’ (2001 [1961]). 
Wright reminds us of Fanon’s debt to Lacan – the importance of the mirror phase for 
deducing ‘the effects of internalized racist stereotypes’ – as well of Fanon’s critique 
of psychoanalytic universalism: ‘like it or not, the Oedipus complex is far from 
coming into being among Negroes’ (Fanon, 1986: 151-2).  ‘The catastrophic failure 
of narcissism’ designated in Black Skin White Masks remains operative in Fanon’s 
later works as a politicized melancholia. But this is a melancholia which, in Wright’s 
view, remains unsusceptible to the ‘multicultural conviviality’ proposed as a possible 
solution to postcolonial melancholia by Gilroy. In the Gilroy model (as in the 
Mitscherlichs’, and the one proposed by Rogers in chapter 6) the structural splitting 
and cultural stagnation caused by an inability to acknowledge the loss of a good self-
image describes the predicament of the colonizer. The psychopathology of the 
colonized subject is a different matter, however. Lacking narcissistic resources, 
according to Fanon, the colonized African subject transforms the more common auto-
destructive impulses of melancholia into a hetero-destructive mania. This is a mania, 
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however, which may sometimes, in Wright’s view, following Fanon, take 
revolutionary form.  
The final three chapters of the volume present us with very different takes on 
the fundamental question of what it means to act. The ‘withdrawal of interest [or 
investment] from the outside world’, which we have seen to be a key narcissistic 
component of melancholia, of course translates politically: and, there’s no shortage of 
opportunities today to be politically depressed. But it is by no means self-evident how 
the relationship between psychoanalytic and political forms of action (including 
active resistance) should be conceived, or how withdrawal from certain social 
structures might itself comprise a politics. The dilemmas of how to participate in and 
partake of political-community life, are addressed directly by Barry Watt in chapter 9, 
who brings his experience as a therapist and a community activist to bear on his 
development of a theory of activism beyond the ‘community of one’. With clear stakes 
in the question ‘how to collectivise amidst the cult of the individual?’, Watt’s 
ambition is to find within the grounds of Freudian metapsychology scope for 
affirming key tenets of an anarchist philosophy, especially with respect to the 
question of possession of private property.  Engaging with political commentary of 
the post-capitalist/neoliberal era (Nick Srnicek & Alex Williams, 2015; Jeremy 
Gilbert, 2015), as well as contemporary philosophies of community (Roberto 
Esposito), he argues for the need to ‘negativise’ community, ‘away from reifying, 
narcissistic notions of the communal towards an emphasis on a melancholic 
foundation […], as that which is not held in common.’  
In chapter 10, Stephen Frosh presents us with a consideration of the politics of 
indifference via the classic statement of Herman Melville’s Bartleby; I would prefer 
not to. Recounting how Bartleby’s flat refrain, which ultimately resists definitive 
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interpretation, has been held as ‘an ideal in the context of neoliberalism’s massive 
pressure towards action’, Frosh offers a counter tale: the story of Bontsha the Silent, 
by Yiddish writer Isaac Leib Peretz (1894). With this story, Frosh asks how the 
psychoanalytic and political configurations of silence come to be so culturally 
overdetermined. From one perspective, silence today is a possible response to the 
neurotic anxieties impelled by global capitalism: the constant goading of desire that 
will never be fulfilled. Frosh sees two complementary character types emerging from 
this contemporary milieu: the hysteric moving endlessly towards the ‘big Other 
without a lack’, and the paranoid willing to stand in for the big Other as long as he is 
bolstered ‘more and more by a community of followers’. ‘The number of hysterical 
subjects who are on the run, looking for a new master, keeps on increasing’ writes 
Frosh characterizing the psychic disturbances of modern life to which silence might 
be one answer. His reading of Bontsha however deflates any default notion that 
silence is dignified, or apparent passivity underwritten by a superior political faith. 
Bontsha’s fate in the afterlife, able to summon only the weakest, most comfortable 
and self-serving desire (a hot roll with fresh butter for breakfast) when anything is 
possible, serves as a counter-weight to the enigmatic subversion of Bartleby. 
Withdrawal is understandable, but it might also replicate the structures it retreats 
from; above all, it might replicate paranoia. The cost of Bontsha’s silence, suggests 
Frosh, is closure and the incapacitation of a political community founded on 
‘speaking out’.  
In the final chapter of the volume, Anastasios Gaitanidis connects Freud’s 
conception of the ego as ‘the precipitate of abandoned object cathexes’ to the motif of 
the journeying subject who returns home. The sense of mobility is important to 
Gaitanidis, as much as the sense that the subject always returns home different from 
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when he left, because it allows him to foreground the value of transience in any 
community-building endeavor. Gaitanidis’s argument is at odds with what he sees as 
the valorization of melancholia in Judith Butler’s work; although we may concede the 
virtues of a ‘collectivity which prioritises our ethical responsibility to each other 
generated by our common experience of loss’, Gaitanidis warns us to be wary of 
replicating in inverted or negative terms the narcissistic illusion of permanence and 
stability. Butler, he argues, through her kinship of the precarious, has neglected to 
focus enough on the interruptive or transient nature of journeying, migrant subjects, 
and the unreliable pleasures to be had in letting go, or moving on. In the place of 
melancholia, Gaitanidis places the figure of exhaustion. The exhausted subject who 
fails to arrive back home, and whose attachments are transient and un-recuperated 
through time, carries with her the important realization that as much as communities 
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